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BOOK REVIEWS
TH

AMcCAN LEGAL SYSTEM. By Lewis Mayers. New York: Harper

Brothers, 1955. Pp. iv, 589. $6.50.
The author of this book is professor of law not in a law school but in
a college, the City College of New York. The book seems to have
grown out of courses meant to constitute a part of a general college
education rather than the preparation for the legal profession. It is
addressed not, or not so much, to the law student or the lawyer but
to the citizen who wishes to inform himself about the legal machinery
of his country. The book should also be of value, however, to the
member of the legal profession who for once intends to see not only
the trees but the forest. It should be of help to the young college student who considers the law as a possible future career. It will be of
special interest to that steadily growing number of foreign observers
who are looking for an American exposition of the total structure of
the administration of justice in the United States.
Until quite recently it was difficult to find a book to which one could
refer such an observer or which could be used as a basis for courses
on introduction to American law for foreign students, such as are
offered at the University of Chicago Law School, or at such foreign
universities as Frankfurt, Paris, Oslo or West Berlin. A collection of
cases and materials, such as those contained in the excellent books by
Pirsig or Benson and Fryer, would be of little use to a foreign student
without the guidance of an American law teacher. Kinnane's text on
the common law is usable for the purpose but limited to the basic
elements. Torstein Eckhoff's fine introduction is sealed to all but the
few who can read Norwegian. The recent French treatise by Andr6
and Suzanne Tunc has become available only this year. It is written
by a pair of continental scholars for continental readers, and understandable only to those who know French. For all those who cannot
make use of the European books, Professor Mayers' book will constitute the most suitable introduction. Those who can will regard it as a
welcome addition, not only because its American flavor cannot be
reproduced abroad but also because its subject matter is not the
same as that of the books just mentioned.
This subject matter is not fully recognizable from the title, which
might be understood to indicate that the book deals with the entire
legal system of the United States including or, perhaps even emphasizing, the substantive law of the country and its sources. This is
not the case, however. It is the sub-title which gives a more descriptive
indication of the contents: "The Administration of Justice in the United
110
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States by Judicial, Administrative, Military, and Arbitral Tribunals."
Not the substantive law of the United States is the concern of the author, but the machinery by which it is administered, the tribunals and
their procedure. As also indicated by the sub-title, the description is
not limited to the "courts" in the commonly understood sense of the
term. Professor Mayers' survey goes far beyond the traditional, though
artificial, limit; it covers every kind of dispute-deciding or lawadministering agency in the United States, the courts of the nation and
the states on all levels from the justice of the peace to the Supreme
Court of the United States, the administrative agencies, boards, commissions and tribunals, the various kinds of military courts, including
military commissions, occupation courts, military government and
High Commission courts, and even the private agencies of arbitration
in commercial, labor and other matters. The only tribunals of which
no description is given, although they are mentioned, are the consular
courts. They have not fully disappeared, as the author seems to believe. These manifold agencies are described not in the sense of a
presentation of the individual features of every particular administrative or other agency, but by way of a general treatment of the features
by which the various kinds of deciding agencies and their procedures
are characterised. Owing to the fantastic complexity of our American
system the task is enormous. It is also difficult intrinsically. Every
expositor of a technical subject for lay readers constantly finds himself
caught upon the horns of a dilemma: on the one hand he must concentrate on the essentials and present them in a style which the layman
can understand; on the other hand he must be sufficiently accurate so
as not to mislead the reader or bore him with generalities. A good
popularization requires not only a full technical mastery of the subject
but also the gift of empathy and the skill of good, vivid writing. Professor Mayers has well approximated these ideals, even though he has
in parts succumbed to the temptation of being more legalistic than the
purpose of the book might justify. The very first chapters, which are
concerned with the tortured topic of the distribution of powers between the nation and the state, constitute particularly arduous reading.
The next following chapters on the administration of criminal justice
will reward the reader with the relief of greater liveliness and understandability. Within a short space of just a little over one hundred
pages one finds a vivid description of the course of a criminal prosecution from the first investigatory steps of the police to the final stages
of appellate proceedings. It is close to life and tied to that general
body of knowledge which the average citizen can be expected to have.
The author has also well succeeded in making understandable the
much more intricate features of civil procedure in its several American
variants. For the legally-trained reader the most rewarding part of
the book may well be the sequence of chapters on "administrative
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tribunals and their supervision by the courts," in which a vast mass
of heterogeneous material is neatly arranged so as to throw into
clear relief its significance, the basic problems and the manifold attempts at their solution.
Throughout his book, the author not only describes the present state
of affairs and its historical background but also subjects it to sagacious
criticism, often combined with suggestions for constructive improvement. He also does not fail to point out the many ways in which our
administration of justice is subject to political influences, legitimate
and illegitimate, and how they operate. Occasionally, comparisons are
made with what is apodictically called the continental system and
which appears to constitute the common, although not always fully
accurate, American view of French institutions.
Although not strictly limited to a presentation of the "law" concerning the administration of justice in the United States, the book
does not go very much beyond it. In contrast to Dr. R. M. Jackson's
recent work on the Machinery of Justice in England,1 Professor
Mayers' book contains neither statistical nor much other factual data.
It has a distinctly legalistic flavor, without consistently maintaining
the full accuracy of a law book. But as we have already observed, the
task of the author has been enormously difficult, and he has handled
it with remarkable skill and competence.
MAX RHEINsTEiN::'

THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. By
Robert H. Jackson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.
Pp. 92. $2.00.
Among the leaders of the New Deal, none was more aggressive than
Robert H. Jackson. As Assistant General Counsel of the Treasury, he
espoused the use of the taxing power to equalize income and distribute
wealth, and he proudly defended a proposed estate tax on the ground
that its effect on the Henry Ford fortune would be to "convert what is
now a family industry into a widely owned one." He was the New
Deal's most outspoken foe of big business and, as Assistant Attorney
General for the Anti-Trust Division, he created a national furor by
charging that the 1937 recession was deliberately contrived by a
"strike of capital" against the government for the purpose of embarrassing the administration's reform program. Next to Roosevelt
himself, Jackson was the most articulate advocate of the use of governmental power to bring about economic and social, as well as
political, democracy; he said that he supported the New Deal with
* Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago.
1. 2d ed. 1953.
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"far more doubts about its adequacy than about its moderation." He
was Roosevelt's choice as Democratic candidate for governor of New
York in 1938, but was too radical for the state organization, which
insisted on the renomination of the conservative incumbent-Herbert
Lehman.
Jackson was the administration's most effective legal critic of the
nullification of the New Deal program by the Supreme Court. His
argument in support of the "packing" plan was acknowledged by all
to be the ablest and most reasoned of any given. As Solicitor General,
he contributed a major part in the clearing away of the constitutional
rubbish which had accumulated over the years; his briefs and oral
arguments before the Court were so brilliant that Justice Brandeis is
supposed to have said that Jackson should be Solicitor General for
life. His book, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, is still the most
fascinating account yet written of the great constitutional struggle
of the thirties; and it still affords the most candid and persuasive statement of a major thesis of the liberals of that day: that when great
political, economic and social issues have been debated and resolved in
political arenas by elected representatives, it is no proper function of
the judiciary to thwart the democratic will by a "tortured construction" of the Constitution which equates the validity of legislation
with the political, economic and social predilections of the Court.
What happens when a New Dealer, committed both to the realization
of a fuller democracy and to a doctrine of judicial self-restraint, is
appointed to the Supreme Court? Much of what has been written
about Jackson, particularly since his death in October of 1954, has
depicted him as a liberal New Dealer who became a conservative
Supreme Court Justice. Critics have paired him with Justice Frankfurter in contrast with Justices Black and Douglas, both of whom,
if not as intimate with Roosevelt as was Jackson, were nevertheless
prominent New Dealers prior to appointment to the Court. If it is
true that Jackson became a conservative while Black and Douglas
remained liberals, then it is because the labels, as applied to Supreme
Court Justices, no longer have the same meaning they once had.
For during his tenure as a Justice, Jackson fairly consistently adhered
to his philosophy of judicial self-restraint by the Supreme Court,
and consciously deferred to the President and the Congress as the
ultimate policy-makers, regardless of whether that policy was "liberal"
or not. Justices Black and Douglas, on the other hand, have become
known as "judicial activists" who do not hesitate consciously to give
constitutional and statutory language that interpretation which they
feel is more apt to effectuate democratic values.
To put it bluntly, Justices Black and Douglas are not loath to mold
the law in accordance with their own political, economic and social
predilections; this, of course, is the very judicial technique for which
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the old Court was so roundly damned by the New Deal liberals. But
if Jackson was consistent in his adherence to judicial self-restraint,
Black and Douglas are also consistent from another point of view.
If the ultimate value is the achieving of a more democratic society,
then it is arguable that the judiciary, no less than the executive and the
legislature, should play its part. Judicial technique then becomes a
variable-judicial self-restraint when the elected representatives effectuate democratic values, supplemented by judicial activism, when
the elected representatives either cannot or do not act, as the particular contribution of the Court. The difference, then, between Jackson
on the one hand and Black or Douglas on the other is as to the proper
scope and exercise of the judicial function in a democratic society. It
smacks of dogmatism to say that either of their divergent attitudes
is clearly wrong; but it is also doctrinaire, and superficial as well, to
label Jackson a conservative and Black and Douglas liberals.
At the time of his death, Justice Jackson had substantially completed what were to be delivered as the Godkin lectures at Harvard,
and it is these three lectures which have now been published in the
book under review. The Supreme Court is discussed in each essay from
a different point of view: as a unit of government, as a law court, and
as a political institution.
As a unit of government, Jackson finds the Court to be "in vital
respects a dependent body." The political branches nominate and
confirm the Justices, they may alter the number of Justices, and it is
they which must execute the Court's mandates. Further, Congress
may control the Court's appellate jurisdiction, and Congress also
controls the funds needed by the Court to operate. The jurisdictional
limitation to cases and controversies, the fact that courts are passive
instruments moved by the initiative of litigants, the procedural confinement to the record made in the lower court, and the limited scope
of a judgment or decree, further circumscribe the Court's function.
Finally, the working methods of the Court "tend to cultivate a highly
individualistic rather than a group viewpoint." (p. 16) As a result of
these jurisdictional, procedural and political shortcomings, Jackson
is of the opinion that the Court is ill suited for solving many of the
problems of modern society, even when they are cast in constitutional
or legal form.
The most interesting part of the discussion of the Court as a law '
court is that dealing with diversity jurisdiction. Jackson states flatly:
"In my judgment the greatest contribution Congress could make to
the orderly administration of justice in the United States would be
to abolish the jurisdiction of the federal courts which is based solely
on the ground that the litigants are citizens of different states." (p. 37)
His review of the considerations leading to this opinion is so compelling as to be virtually unanswerable. This chapter in the book also
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contains a discussion of the administrative process and judicial review
of the orders of administrative agencies which, although interesting
(Jackson could not be otherwise) contains nothing new or unorthodox.
Most readers will probably be more interested in the discussion of
the Court as a political institution. Jackson is aware of the fine line
between political science and legal science and says with his customary
candor, "Any decision that declares the law under which a people
must live or which affects the powers of their institutions is in a very
real sense political." (p. 53) The great political function which the
Court is called upon to perform is to strive to maintain, in "a society
in which rapid changes tend to upset all equilibrium,

...

the great

system of balances upon which our free government is based." (p. 61)
Jackson then discusses in turn each of these balances: between the
Executive and Congress; between the central government and the
states; between state and state; and between authority and liberty,
or the rule of the majority and the rights of the individual.
But in discharging this function, the extent to which the Court can,
or even should, contribute to the preservation of free government is,
in Jackson's view, fairly limited. He assails the "cult of libertarian
judicial activists" and finds their doctrine "wholly incompatible with
faith in democracy." (pp. 57-58) He states his own philosophy that
such an institution as the Court, functioning by the methods it does,
"cannot and should not try to seize the initiative in shaping the policy
of the law, either by constitutional interpretation or statutory construction." (p. 79) He warns against relying upon the judiciary to
save the country from intolerance, passion, usurpation and tyranny
and states his own belief that "the attitude of a society and of its
organized political forces, rather than its legal machinery, is the
controlling force in the character of free institutions." (p. 81)
In all this Jackson is subject to the fair criticism that, in counseling
against over-estimating what the Court can do to maintain and further
effectuate a democratic society, he himself has under-estimated its
potential and would not have it fulfill its function even to the extent
possible. Because the Court cannot alone guarantee the promotion or
perpetuation of democratic values, or because it is incapable of
prevailing against the political forces if they are bent in other directions, it does not follow that the Court should not make its contribution when, and to the extent that, it can. A good case can be
made that the judicial activists would have the Court go too far beyond
the line (assuming it exists) which separates interpretation fr6m
legislation. But an equally good case can be made that the Court
should not lag too far behind the line by making a fetish of judicial
self-restraint and deprecating to excess the reach of the Court's
influence. If Jackson is right that the great political function of the
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Court is to maintain the various balances in our society, then arguably
it is better that the Court should perform its function, not timorously
but boldly, and with courage rather than trepidation. That Jackson
himself was willing on great occasions to "seize the initiative in
shaping the policy of the law" is manifested by his joining, even as he
was preparing these lectures, in the unanimous opinion of the Court
in the school segregation cases.
Regardless of what one thinks of the Supreme Court and its function
in our system of government, he cannot read this book without profit.
It is doubtless superfluous to add that, coming from the pen of Robert
H. Jackson, the style is what would be expected of him who is conceded to have been the best writer on the Court. To that judgment
there have been, so far as I know, no dissenting opinions filed.
WILLTAM P. MURPHY*

LAW. By Charles P. Curtis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. 178. $3.75
IT's You

This reviewer is no legal philosopher. Occasionally people who do
not know him try, with the best of intentions, to get him into that role.
This is one of those occasions. But he must bow out. He can only
attempt the task on the basis that he is a practicing lawyer who enjoys
extracurricular activities of a practical rather than a philosophical
nature.
What Mr. Curtis has written will interest and instruct the lawyer
who is engaged in the run of the mill rough and tumble work of the
profession just as much as the lawyer who is a student of the background and foundation of law. For Mr. Curtis has presented his
philosophy in such a homely fashion that the lawyer who runs and
reads will understand and, understanding, will do better his day's
work. It is important that the lawyer appreciate his own importance.
It contributes to this appreciation if the lawyer knows that when
he prepares a good partnership agreement he is doing something more
than serving an immediate client, that he is adding to the sum total of
material available for all those who come after him who want to
enter into partnership relationships. Mr. Curtis tells us this. Under
the sub-heading, "Lawyers as Legislators," he says:
'"You see the tractors laboring majestically across the field, cultivating
the land. You don't see the earthworms. They are even less conscious
of the magnitude of their achievement than the lawyers are of their part
in legislation. The Congress in Washington and the legislatures in the
state capitals pass laws. The administrative agencies turn out regulations,
Associate Professor of Law University of Mississippi.
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The courts hand down judicial decisions and opinions. We forget, even
the lawyers themselves forget, that it is the lawyers in their offices who
make the bulk of our law." (p. 42)
Speaking of partnership articles, corporation by-laws, corporate
mortgages and the like, he says, "It is impossible not to give these
private authorities a legislative standing in the law." (p. 43)
It is heartening for the lawyer whose clients make him "work like
a horse and live like a hermit"-to quote Lord Macmillan-to feel
that his work is not entirely evanescent. For the force which drives
the lawyer is not the desire to earn a fee but the pride which he can
take in the quality of his work as compared with the work of other
lawyers. Mr. Curtis asks: "I wonder if there is anything more exalted
than the intense pleasure of doing a job as well as you can irrespective
of its usefulness or even of its purpose." (p. 36) But he does not intend
to imply that the lawyer's work is useless or that its purpose is other
than to serve the public.
There are many places in the book where earthy advice to the
lawyer comes through. One of them is in the discussion of the importance that a lawyer detach himself from his client. It is pointed
out that what the client needs as much as anything else is an approach
to the problem without prejudice, emotion or worry. In order that
he may give this, the lawyer must not permit the difficulties and
troubles of his clients to become his own. He must build a mental
barrier in order to protect his detachment. Sometimes lawyers fear
that in doing this they are acting selfishly and in their own interest.
Mr. Curtis proves the contrary.
I do not agree with the Curtis theory of interpretation, which, as I
understand it, is to give a legal instrument the meaning which the
person to whom it is addressed gives it provided that he does not unduly stretch "the tether of" the words. (p. 62) I am old-fashioned
enough to prefer the Vaughan Hawkins theory that words should be
given the meaning which the writer gave them or would have given
them if the question in issue had been brought to his attention. But
many a lawyer will find the Curtis theory useful when the application
of the traditional theory would shatter his case.
Mr. Curtis goes from interpretation to legal draftsmanship, which
he regards as the "obverse of the coin." (p. 67) He describes what,
in his opinion, lawyers actually do when they draft instruments.
The lawyer does not in fact try by the use of words to be so specific
as to bind for all time and under all conditions those who are affected
by the writing. On the contrary, he appreciates that there must be
play in every legal document and proceeds upon that theory. Mr.
Curtis carries this to the extreme of saying that what we should
"admire in legal draftsmanship is not precision. It is a precisely ap-
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propriate degree of imprecision." (p. 76) He recognizes, however,
that the draftsman must exercise sound judgment in knowing when
and to what extent to leave the meaning loose and he does not suggest
that his method would make good draftsmanship any easier. But
the lazy lawyer, applying the Curtis theory of interpretation to what
Mr. Curtis says about draftsmanship, might give it a meaning which
would authorize him in being a little careless in the preparation of his
documents.
The discussion of the jury is discerning and delightful. His first
sentence is: "My uncle used to say that the jury served the great
purpose of ridding the neighborhood of its sons of bitches." (p. 91)
One who knew the uncle can almost hear him saying it, for he was a
forceful and forthright Cape Codder if there ever was one. This was
merely by way of introduction to the function of the jury in making
exceptions, which Curtis points out they do by violating their oaths.
But he says that that is better than tempting the judge to violate
his oath.
The question has been raised whether we should not follow the
English precedent recently established and abolish jury trial in most
civil cases including particularly negligence cases. One reason advanced for not doing so in negligence cases in jurisdictions having a
rule of contributory negligence is that the judge is bound by it whereas
the jury applies with great liberality its own rough rule of comparative negligence. The analysis of the jury process which Mr. Curtis
makes would seem to support the retention of the jury system except
perhaps in those jurisdictions which have adopted the comparative
negligence rule by statute. And Mr. Curtis might approve trial before
a judge in those jurisdictions.
The final chapter is on courts of appeal. There we practitioners
learn enough about the judicial process to feel justified in discarding
the slavish adherence to tradition and precedent which, when I first
wrote briefs in 1910, required the citation, summarization and distinguishing of an infinite number of cases. And that is very helpful.
I must not ignore, however, what Mr. Curtis says about the Supreme
Court of the United States and the willingness of the people of this
country to let it be their conscience and their guide, to let it fight for
the things that they ought to be strong enough to insist upon getting
for themselves through their legislative representatives.
,Curtis criticizes the citizenry for its shortcomings. But he recognizes
that a republic, populated by human beings, must give the Legislature
a certain play of emotions and, at the same time, impose some limitation. It wisely does this through a Constitution drafted with the appropriate amount of imprecision and a Supreme Court with power to
restrain the Legislature despite the shifting winds of popular demand

'1955 ]

BOOK REVIEWS

and with a discretion to allow leeway or to work up to windward, as
occasion may require.
Those who read It's Your Law carefully will learn not only to be
better lawyers but also to make a start toward becoming philosophers.
HARRISON TwEED*

Fomus (Vol. 5). Edited by Louis R. Frumer.
New York: Matthew-Bender & Company, 1955. Pp. xiv, 918.

BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

The only way to learn the true value of any lawbook is to work with
it. Some time ago I reviewed in these pages Bender's FederalPractice
Forms, of which only the first four volumes were then available.' The
remarks which I made in that review were based upon a somewhat
cursory examination; but since then the books have stood upon the
shelves in my office (at such times as they were not in use or had
not been borrowed by one of my brother lawyers) and I have had
occasion to learn their utility in daily practice. As a result I have
no desire to modify or withdraw any of my earlier comments; but on
the contrary were I reviewing the entire treatise at this time, I should
cast my remarks in a somewhat stronger form, for experience has
borne out what was then largely anticipation.
There has, however, been one substantial handicap to the complete
utility of this lormulary, and that has been the absence of an index.
This has now been removed by the publication of the fifth and last
volume of the set, which contains an alphabetical listing of topics occupying more than four hundred pages. With its help, even the most
unlikely subject can be traced to its proper page and section, thus
eliminating much wasted time in fruitless searching and speculation.
Nor are the contents of this final volume confined to such tables. In
addition, there are the rules of the United States Supreme Court (those
effective July 1, 1954), together with some eighty-six forms applicable
to them, and one hundred and six forms devised in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. While the latter may seem
disproportionate to the more than four thousand forms listed under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it must be remembered that
many of the forms are applicable to both, and only those exclusively
criminal in nature have been included in this final volume. The result
is a comprehensive and accurate collection of examples of every form
which the average practitioner in the federal courts is likely to need
* Member, Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley, New York.
1. Book Review, 7 VAND. L. REv. 726 (1954).
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in any type of practice; and the set of five volumes, now complete,
makes a welcome addition to the library of any lawyer who has
occasion to go into those courts.
WALTER P. ARMSTRON, JR.',
* Member, Armstrong, McCadden, Allen, Braden & Goodman, Memphis, Tennessee.

